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ABSTRACT 
  In the first decade of the twentieth century, political party 
operatives have manipulated the boundaries of congressional 
districting maps to an unprecedented extent in the interest of gaining 
partisan advantage. The judiciary, led by a fractured Supreme Court, 
has refused to intervene, holding claims of unconstitutional partisan 
gerrymandering nonjusticiable for want of a workable judicial 
standard. 
  The epidemic of partisan gerrymandering has harmed the electoral 
process in ways that mirror the harm caused by legislative 
malapportionment prior to the 1960s. In that decade, the Court 
assertively invoked the Equal Protection Clause to effect 
reapportionment and bring congressional districting maps in line with 
updated population patterns. This Note revisits the reapportionment 
cases, examines the political and jurisprudential context at the time 
they were decided, and posits that well-reasoned decisions by the 
Court that correct a breakdown in the democratic process will gain 
public acceptance over time and strengthen the legitimacy of the 
Court. This is the lesson of the reapportionment cases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In June 2006, the Supreme Court decided the case of League of 
United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry.1 Commentators 
across the nation recognized the action underlying this legal 
challenge—the Texas Republicans’ 2003 partisan gerrymander of the 
map used to elect their state’s congressional delegation—as an 
egregious example of partisan politics run amuck.2 Justice John Paul 
Stevens’s dissenting opinion in LULAC quoted former Texas 
Lieutenant Governor Bill Ratliff, a Republican member of the state 
senate, as saying that “political gain for the Republicans was 110% of 
the motivation for the plan.”3 Both the Texas Republicans, who 
drafted the plan without any real input from their Democratic 
colleagues, and the Texas Democrats, who fled the state on two 
occasions in a failed attempt to prevent the plan’s adoption, displayed 
their partisan political interests on their sleeves.4 
A number of individuals and organizations immediately 
commenced litigation designed to challenge the Texas redistricting 
plan on several grounds.5 In particular, they challenged the 
gerrymander’s partisan nature by alleging an unconstitutional dilution 
 
 1. League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006). 
 2. E.g., Editorial, Drawing the Line on Redistricting, WASH. POST, July 1, 2003, at A13 
(“In Texas, things already have reached truly wacky dimensions . . . .”); Editorial, DeLay 
Tactics, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 14, 2005, at C10 (“Given the gerrymander’s deep roots 
and political pitfalls, courts have tried to stay out of all but the most extreme gerrymandering 
cases. The [Texas districting] plan is that extreme.”); Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Trouble With Texas, 
NAT’L J., Mar. 4, 2006, at 13 (describing “the egregious gerrymander that Tom DeLay helped 
ram through the Texas Legislature in 2003”).  
 3. LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2629 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 4. See David M. Halbfinger, Across U.S., Redistricting as a Never-Ending Battle, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 1, 2003, at A21 (“[T]he battle in Texas captured national attention last month, when 
51 Democratic members of the state House fled in chartered buses to Ardmore, Okla., holing 
up in a Holiday Inn for four days until a crucial procedural deadline passed. By denying 
Republicans a quorum, they killed a redistricting bill for the moment, but the ploy came at a 
price in scorn from late-night comedians and seemed to alienate many Texans.”). 
 5. E.g., Plaintiffs, Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee and Congresswoman Eddie 
Bernice Johnson, Request for Declaratory Judgment Relief, Injunctive Relief and First 
Amended Complaint at 1–2, Session v. Perry, 457 F. Supp. 2d 716 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (No. 
2:03CV354). Plaintiffs challenged the plan for being not only a partisan political gerrymander, 
but also an unconstitutional exercise in minority group vote dilution under the Voting Rights 
Act. Id. at 12–13. The plaintiffs’ Voting Rights Act claims are beyond the scope of this Note. 
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of the voting strength of Texas Democrats under the Equal 
Protection Clause.6 
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court dismissed 
the partisan gerrymandering claim as a nonjusticiable political 
question.7 Agreeing with four of his fellow Justices that the lack of a 
workable judicial standard precluded courts from reaching the merits 
of partisan gerrymandering claims, Justice Anthony Kennedy refused 
to hold that all such claims are inherently nonjusticiable, reasoning 
that a workable judicial standard may emerge in future years.8 
After probing the partisan gerrymandering crisis, this Note draws 
upon the lessons of the Court’s landmark decisions in the 
reapportionment era to predict the American polity’s likely response 
should a future court decide to assertively police partisan 
gerrymanders. Considered with the lessons of the reapportionment 
era in mind, the arguments against the justiciability of partisan 
gerrymanders and the criticisms of the flaws inherent in each of the 
prospective standards available to identify an unconstitutional 
partisan gerrymander seem to lose much of their strength.9 
The Court’s refusal to correct the breakdown in the democratic 
process brought on by the advent of egregious partisan gerrymanders 
has invited the continued use of districting processes with deeply 
troubling pathologies. This Note reaches the conclusion that the 
strength of the arguments lodged against judicial review of partisan 
gerrymandering is overstated. In time, the American public would 
view a future Court’s decision to assertively police partisan 
gerrymanders as a courageous and necessary move that would fortify 
the legitimacy of the Court. 
 
 6. Id. at 1–2 (“Plaintiffs . . . file this . . . Complaint asserting that the acts undertaken by 
Defendants are unconstitutional (redistricting undertaken by the state inconsistent with . . . the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and acts of the Defendant[s] constitute 
unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering).”). LULAC received great media scrutiny in both the 
legal and mainstream press. E.g., The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. 
REV. 125, 243 (2006); Linda Greenhouse, Justices Uphold Most Remapping in Texas by G.O.P., 
N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2006, at A1. 
 7. LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2612. 
 8. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 311 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 9. See John Hart Ely, Gerrymanders: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
607, 611 (1998) (“[The] standard criticisms of [available partisan gerrymandering standards] 
strike me as overblown, but they seem to represent the conventional wisdom in this country.”). 
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I.  BREAKDOWN OF THE DEMOCRATIC  
PROCESS IN THE ERA OF PARTISAN GERRYMANDERS 
Early in the twenty-first century, partisan gerrymanders of 
congressional districting schemes have skewed the democratic process 
and polarized Congress to an unprecedented extent.10 It is no longer 
uncommon for a statewide districting plan to transparently represent 
“a total legislative railroading” of the minority party’s voters.11 A 
confluence of forces has brought the electorate to this state of affairs. 
Rapid advances in information technology have made extreme 
partisan gerrymanders possible, and an increasingly rancorous 
political climate has driven partisan operatives to engineer wildly 
unbalanced districting schemes. 
A. The Causes of the Breakdown 
1. Rapid Advances in Technology.  Partisan gerrymanders are 
not new to the American political experience. The term 
“gerrymander” dates to 1812; the word itself is a combination of the 
last name of Elbridge Gerry, then governor of Massachusetts, and the 
word “salamander,” so chosen because the redistricting plan favored 
by Governor Gerry featured districts so stretched and contorted that 
they were said to resemble salamanders.12 In the few hundred years 
since Governor Gerry’s time in office, politicians at every level of 
government have routinely drawn district boundaries with political 
considerations in mind.13 Indeed, those who criticize partisan 
 
 10. See Mark Tushnet, Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and the Chastening of 
Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29, 46 (1999) (“Because the districts in Congress 
are more and more one-party dominated, the American Congress is more extreme.” (quoting 
U.S. Rep. John Tanner)). 
 11. Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Doing Our Politics in Court: Gerrymandering, “Fair 
Representation” and an Exegesis into the Judicial Role, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 527, 571 (2003) 
(referencing Ind. State Sen. Charles Bosma’s statement in his deposition that “I don’t make 
goals for the opposite team,” quoted in Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1484 (S.D. Ind. 
1984) (Pell, J., dissenting), rev’d, 478 U.S. 109 (1986)). 
 12. American Treasures of the Library of Congress, The Gerrymander, http://www.loc.gov 
/exhibits/treasures/trr113.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2008) (“In 1812, Jeffersonian Republicans 
forced through the Massachusetts legislature a bill rearranging district lines to assure them an 
advantage in the upcoming senatorial elections. . . . [A] Federalist editor is said to have 
exclaimed upon seeing the new district lines, ‘Salamander! Call it a Gerrymander.’”). 
 13. According to the Court in Vieth, 
Political gerrymanders are not new to the American scene . . . There were allegations 
that Patrick Henry attempted (unsuccessfully) to gerrymander James Madison out of 
the First Congress . . . . By 1840 the gerrymander was a recognized force in party 
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gerrymandering generally concede that it is impossible to remove 
politics from the equation completely.14 
What has changed, however, is the extent of the manipulation. 
Rapid advances in research and information technology have made it 
possible to redistrict state maps along partisan lines in a way that was 
not possible or even conceivable in the past.15 The legislators who 
engineer modern partisan gerrymanders have purposefully kept pace 
with the rapid changes in technology that make it easier to 
manipulate voter information and thereby effectuate increasingly 
egregious gerrymanders when drawing district boundaries. “Recent 
cases now document in microscopic detail the astonishing precision 
with which redistricters can carve up individual precincts and 
distribute them between districts with confidence concerning the . . . 
partisan consequences.”16 The ever-accelerating rate of technological 
progress has produced not only a difference in degree but a difference 
in kind regarding the level of partisanship that feeds into the 
districting process.17 As John Hart Ely put it, “Give a latter-day 
 
politics and was generally attempted in all legislation enacted for the formation of 
election districts. It was generally conceded that each party would attempt to gain 
power which was not proportionate to its numerical strength. 
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 274–75 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted). 
 14. See Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 11, at 541 (“Redistricting is a zero-sum game, a 
condition that the utmost care may not overcome. Thus, even the most careful of redistricters 
will have to place individuals in some districts where the votes will be insignificant.”). 
 15. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 345 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he increasing efficiency of 
partisan redistricting has damaged the democratic process to a degree that our predecessors 
only began to imagine.”); Tony Quinn, Gerrymandering: Crazy-Quilt Districts Make Your Vote 
Pointless, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2004, at M2 (“That was before computers, databases and 
Machiavellian map-drawers drained the competition out of House elections.”). 
 16. Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan Redistricting, 106 
YALE L.J. 2505, 2553–54 (1997); see also Vieth, 541 U.S. at 346 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“A 
computer may grind out district lines which can totally frustrate the popular will on an 
overwhelming number of critical issues.” (citing Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 551 (1969) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting))). 
 17. Although “[g]errymanders are partisan by definition,” the first decade of the twenty-
first century has produced partisan gerrymanders—of which the Texas gerrymander is 
representative—that differ from past gerrymanders in that they skew the results of 
Congressional elections to the point at which the majority of seats are rendered uncontested. 
DeLay Tactics, supra note 2. Congressional Quarterly has statistically analyzed the way in which 
most Congressional seats are insulated from competition:  
According to the Congressional Quarterly, new gerrymander techniques will 
result . . . in only 29 of the 435 [2004] House races being competitive, and the number 
of competitive seats is falling with each election. 
Only a decade ago, CQ was rating more than 100 House seats up for grabs in each 
election. That number fell to 50 in the 2000 and 2002 elections. 
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Elbridge Gerry or Boss Tweed a modern computer, and one 
person/one vote will seem a minor annoyance.”18 
2. A Swell of Partisan Bias.  These advances in technology have 
coincided with an increasing sense of bitter partisanship among the 
members of both major parties, who encourage the use of technology 
to further partisan aims.19 As Justice Kennedy observed in his Vieth v. 
Jubelirer20 concurrence, inflamed partisan sentiment on both sides of 
the aisle has caused legislatures to abandon the “sense of decorum 
and restraint” that good government requires.21 “[O]ur legislators 
have reached the point of declaring that, when it comes to 
apportionment: ‘We are in the business of rigging elections.’”22 
Meanwhile, the two major political parties’ dominance of both 
Congress and the state legislatures has made it highly unlikely that 
Congress will use its Elections Clause authority to intervene and stop 
the outrage.23 Without any judicial involvement in the process, the 
corrosive effect of blatant partisan bias in crafting districting plans is 
likely to get worse before it gets any better.24 
It will never be a simple task to identify how much partisan 
dominance is too much in the context of partisan gerrymanders.25 
 
Editorial, Democratic Cancer: Gerrymander Abuse Knows No Limits, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Sept. 27, 2004, at B6 (italics added). 
 18. John Hart Ely, Confounded by Cromartie: Are Racial Stereotypes Now Acceptable 
Across the Board or Only When Used in Support of Partisan Gerrymanders?, 56 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 489, 505 (2002). See infra notes 71–79 and accompanying text for a definition of the “one-
person, one-vote” standard and a discussion of its significance. 
 19. See Tim Storey, Supreme Court Tackles Texas, ST. LEGISLATURES, Apr. 1, 2006, at 22 
(quoting Tex. State Sen. Rodney Ellis) (describing the Texas gerrymander as “a map adopted 
through a scheme marked by extreme partisanship driven by leaders in Washington”). 
 20. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
 21. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 316 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 22. Id. at 317 (quoting Joseph Hoeffel, Six Incumbents Are a Week Away from Easy 
Election, WINSTON-SALEM J., Jan. 27, 1998, at B1 (quoting former N.C. State Sen. Mark 
McDaniel)) (citation omitted). 
 23. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial Review 
of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 549 (2004) (“The Pennsylvania experience 
shows how the original constitutional design has been undermined by the emergence of national 
political parties. . . . [P]oliticians from other states contributed to the commotion in 
Pennsylvania because they were part of the same faction.”). 
 24. See Quinn, supra note 15 (“The House of Representatives is the house of extremes—
the least representative political body in the world’s major democracies. There is no room for 
diversity of opinion. And it will stay that way.”). 
 25. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 155 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (predicting that the majority’s proposed standard for identifying an unconstitutional 
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That said, the nation’s experience with partisan gerrymanders seems 
to have reached a tipping point; gerrymanders such as the Texas 
gerrymander at issue in LULAC have become so complete, and their 
execution so brazen, that the level of gerrymandering in the first 
decade of the twenty-first century has reduced most congressional 
elections to a “farce” and rendered individual voters’ decisions on 
election day nearly meaningless.26 A fair argument can thus be 
advanced that partisan gerrymandering has, with the assistance of 
modern districting technology, reached the point of a political 
“bloodfeud” that extracts democratic costs every bit as detrimental as 
those once associated with malapportionment.27 
B. The LULAC Case 
The facts underlying LULAC provide a jarring and well-
documented example of the way in which partisan politics have come 
to overwhelm the districting process. In 2003, national media 
attention focused on the Republican-controlled Texas state 
legislature’s extreme partisan gerrymander of the districting scheme 
used to elect Texas’s congressional delegation.28 
As a result of the increase in its population recorded by the 2000 
census, the state of Texas gained two additional seats in Congress.29 
By 2003, the Republicans had come to control both chambers of the 
Texas state legislature and quickly set out to create a new statewide 
districting map.30 Republican Party operatives ran sophisticated 
 
partisan gerrymander will “prove unmanageable and arbitrary”); see also LULAC v. Perry, 126 
S. Ct. 2594, 2611 (2006) (commenting on the difficulty of finding “a standard for deciding how 
much partisan dominance is too much”). 
 26. See Op-Ed, The Gerrymandering Scandal, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 5, 2004, at A17 
(“Thanks to modern gerrymandering, most congressional districts have been turned into a [sic] 
Democratic or Republican monopolies—constituencies meticulously mapped to lock in one-
party supermajorities and guarantee election results long before voters go to the polls.”); 
Editorial, Rescuing U.S. Democracy, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2003, at A30 (“[E]lections for the 
House of Representatives have become something of a farce; results of almost all of them can 
be predicted the day the districts get drawn.”). 
 27. LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2631 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(quoting Balderas v. Texas, Civ. Action No. 6:01CV158 (Nov. 14, 2001) (App. to Juris. 
Statement 209a-210a)).  
 28. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 2. 
 29. LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2606. 
 30. Id. When the results of the 2000 census were announced, Republicans controlled the 
state senate and Democrats wielded a majority in the state house of representatives. Id. Thus 
divided, the state legislature was unable to come to a consensus and create a new statewide 
congressional districting plan that would incorporate the two new seats. Id. To fill the vacuum, a 
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computer models designed to maximize the number of Republicans in 
Texas’s congressional delegation, and the Republican-controlled 
Texas legislature introduced a gerrymander named “Plan 1374C.”31 
“There is little question but that the single-minded purpose of 
the Texas Legislature in enacting Plan 1374C was to gain partisan 
advantage.”32 The Republicans’ introduction of this plan triggered a 
“protracted partisan struggle, during which Democratic legislators left 
the State for a time to frustrate quorum requirements.”33 Ultimately, 
however, the Democrats’ maneuvers could not stop the Republican-
controlled state legislature from implementing Plan 1374C, and the 
legislature officially enacted the gerrymander in October 2003.34 
Litigation challenging Plan 1374C commenced almost 
immediately. The LULAC plaintiffs challenged the districting plan on 
a number of grounds; in particular, the gerrymander’s partisan nature 
was challenged as an unconstitutional vote dilution of the Democratic 
electorate’s voting strength under the Equal Protection Clause.35 
After a tortured procedural history during which the district court 
twice entered judgment against the plaintiffs on the partisan 
gerrymandering claim,36 the Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
upheld Plan 1374C against the claim of partisan gerrymandering.37 
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy disposed of the Texas 
Democrats’ partisan gerrymandering claim by citing an opinion he 
 
Texas federal district court was forced to step in and draw a map, which largely preserved the 
existing districting scheme, devised prior to the 2000 census. See id. (“Once the District Court 
applied [neutral redistricting standards]—such as placing the two new seats in high-growth 
areas, following county and voting precinct lines, and avoiding the pairing of incumbents—the 
drawing ceased, leaving the map free of further change except to conform it to one-person, one-
vote.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 470 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (per curiam), vacated sub 
nom. Jackson v. Perry, 543 U.S. 941 (2004). 
 33. LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2606 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 2609. 
 36. Id. at 2607. Initially, the District Court entered judgment against the challengers on all 
their claims. Id. Soon thereafter, however, the Supreme Court decided Vieth. The Supreme 
Court then vacated the federal district court’s opinion in favor of the state in LULAC and 
remanded back to the district court for reconsideration in light of Vieth. Id. The district court 
again found for the state on remand, reasoning that the Texas map was similar to the 
Pennsylvania map upheld by the Court in Vieth. Id. An appeal was then made to the Supreme 
Court, and the Court granted certiorari. Id. 
 37. Id. at 2626. 
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had written two years earlier in the case of Vieth v. Jubelirer.38 In 
Vieth, the Court had held all claims of partisan gerrymandering 
nonjusticiable—for the time being.39 Justice Kennedy provided the 
critical fifth vote necessary to strike down the Vieth petitioners’ 
partisan gerrymandering claim, but he wrote a concurring opinion to 
rebuff the plurality’s hard stance that would have closed the door on 
the federal courts’ ability to hear partisan gerrymandering claims in 
the future.40 Though he agreed with the plurality that the lack of a 
workable judicial standard at the time precluded courts from reaching 
the merits of partisan gerrymandering claims, Justice Kennedy 
cautioned, “That no such standard has emerged in this case should 
not be taken to prove that none will emerge in the future.”41 
In LULAC, Kennedy tersely preserved the uncertain state of the 
law he had previously sanctioned in Vieth, stating, “[The] 
disagreement persists. A plurality of the Court in Vieth would have 
held such challenges to be nonjusticiable political questions, but a 
majority declined to do so. We do not revisit the justiciability 
holding . . . .”42 
The LULAC Court held that the one major difference between 
LULAC and Vieth—that the reapportionment in Vieth followed a 
decennial census whereas the LULAC reapportionment was an 
unnecessary measure that took place in the middle of the decade—
did not distinguish the LULAC scheme from the one upheld in 
Vieth.43 After dismissing the petitioners’ claims of partisan 
gerrymandering, the Court considered the petitioners’ claims of racial 
 
 38. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 39. Id. at 311 (“That no such standard has emerged in this case should not be taken to 
prove that none will emerge in the future.”). Although not a single other member of the Court 
joined his opinion in Vieth, id. at 306, Justice Kennedy voiced the narrowest grounds for the 
case disposition reached by five Justices. His opinion thus stands as the Court’s controlling 
opinion. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a fragmented Court 
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the 
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in 
the judgments on the narrowest grounds.’” (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 
(1976))). 
 40. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 311 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 41. Id. 
 42. LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2607 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The splintered Vieth 
Court divided 4–1–4 in evaluating the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims, revealing 
the unsettled state of the law on this issue. Four Justices were prepared to consider the merits of 
a partisan gerrymandering claim, while an equal number of Justices were prepared to hold all 
such claims nonjusticiable “political questions.” Vieth, 541 U.S. at 271, 277 (plurality opinion). 
 43. LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2609. 
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vote dilution under the Voting Rights Act44 and found in part for the 
petitioners.45 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in LULAC maintained the 
Court’s jurisprudence in a true state of limbo. Going forward, the 
Court has reserved the right to either enmesh itself in or completely 
distance itself from the contentious partisan districting debate. 
C.  Partisan Politics Recast as Racial Politics 
In both Vieth and LULAC, the Court refused to reach the merits 
of the petitioners’ partisan gerrymandering claims. In both cases, 
however, the Court was prepared to entertain claims alleging the use 
of impermissible race-conscious districting methods. These decisions 
are unsurprising given the Court’s tendency to “express far more 
solicitude toward the claims of groups defined in racial terms, such as 
blacks and Latinos, than toward groups defined in partisan terms.”46 
This phenomenon comports with the traditional view that the Court 
will enforce the Equal Protection Clause most rigorously when the 
rights of “discrete and insular minorities” are involved.47 
If the racial vote-dilution claim and the partisan gerrymandering 
claim had been entirely distinct, the Court’s willingness to hear one 
and not the other would not be an independent basis for concern. 
Racial vote-dilution claims and other race-based Equal Protection 
claims brought in the context of elections, however, almost always 
represent but one dimension of the effects of a comprehensive 
partisan gerrymandering scheme.48 “Bizarrely shaped districts” that 
sort out voters by race are “almost always a joint product” of race-
conscious districting and partisan political machinations.49 Moreover, 
 
 44. Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000). 
 45. See LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2613–23 (“Based on the foregoing, the totality of the 
circumstances demonstrates a § 2 violation.”). A full discussion of the Voting Rights Act claims 
brought by the LULAC plaintiffs is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 46. Kathleen M. Sullivan & Pamela S. Karlan, The Elysian Fields of the Law, 57 STAN. L. 
REV. 695, 709 (2004). 
 47. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). See infra Part IV.A 
for a discussion of the significance of this phenomenon. 
 48. Ely, supra note 18, at 500 (“[T]he legislature may have gone out of its way to include an 
unusually high percentage of black neighborhoods on the theory that an unusually high 
percentage of blacks are likely to vote Democratic.”). 
 49. Pamela S. Karlan, John Hart Ely and the Problem of Gerrymandering: The Lion in 
Winter, 114 YALE L.J. 1329, 1349 (2005). 
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“racial identification is highly correlated with political affiliation.”50 
Given this state of affairs, purely partisan gerrymanders may 
masquerade as racially conscious redistricting plans. Thus, “racial 
gerrymandering and political gerrymandering are frequently one and 
the same.”51 
Meanwhile, the groups most interested and best equipped to 
bring lawsuits alleging defects in the electoral process tend to be the 
political parties. “Even if the plaintiffs themselves are not political 
activists—and often they are—the lawsuits are nearly always financed 
and run by political parties.”52 The natural confluence of these two 
scenarios creates a perverse incentive for “disappointed players in the 
cruel game of partisan redistricting to recast themselves as aggrieved 
parties in equal protection dramas defined by race.”53 
Thus, whether a given body of litigation takes the form of a racial 
vote-dilution claim or a more direct allegation of partisan 
gerrymandering, the “true motivation behind [these lawsuits] is 
almost always to change the political complexion of the legislative 
body or delegation as a whole.”54 Given that the issue of race in the 
United States is “already explosive,” the Court’s willingness to 
encourage partisan election complaints to be recast in the divisive 
terms of racial identity is an unfortunate consequence of its 
jurisprudence.55 
 
 50. Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 633 
(2002) (quoting Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 243 (2001)); see Anthony Q. Fletcher, Note, 
White Lines, Black Districts—Shaw v. Reno and the Dilution of the Anti-Dilution Principle, 29 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 231, 251 (1994) (observing that minority voters exhibit a “tendency to 
overwhelmingly support ‘liberal’ candidates and viewpoints”). The propensity for African-
American voters to support the Democratic Party is but one example of this social pattern. See 
id. at 251 n.125 (“Both Democratic and Republican party analysts agree that the overwhelming 
majority of . . . registered black voters [in the United States] are Democrats.”). 
 51. Fletcher, supra note 50, at 249. 
 52. Sullivan & Karlan, supra note 46, at 710. 
 53. See Issacharoff, supra note 50, at 632 (“[T]he courts provided a second forum for 
redistricting battles if, and only if, the redistricting losers could recast themselves as victims of 
excessive consideration of race.”). The Court’s refusal to hear partisan gerrymandering claims 
forces all such claims into the “suffocating category of race.” Id. at 630–31. Issacharoff notes, 
“Indeed, this became the defining legal pattern in the 1990 round of redistricting . . . .” Id. at 
632. 
 54. Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next Time: Reapportionment After the 2000 Census, 50 
STAN. L. REV. 731, 736 (1998). 
 55. See Issacharoff, supra note 50, at 597 (discussing the “already explosive issues of race in 
the redistricting battles”). 
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If a future Court is to change course and attempt to cure the 
breakdown in the democratic process brought on by partisan 
gerrymandering, it must be willing to face the short-term criticism 
that such a decision would invite. The Court could take comfort in the 
belief that the American public would recognize the wisdom of its 
decision in the long run, as the lessons of the reapportionment 
experience suggest. 
II.  LESSONS OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT EXPERIENCE 
During the first half of the 1960s, the Supreme Court decided a 
number of cases that drastically changed the composition of state 
legislatures and congressional delegations from states across the 
nation. This period has since been dubbed “the reapportionment era” 
in recognition of the way in which the Court’s decisions brought 
antiquated electoral systems in line with existing population 
demographics. In the face of a grave crisis in the democratic electoral 
process, these decisions “brought about massive, nationwide political 
reform where before prospects for change had been hopeless.”56 
More than forty years have passed since these venerated 
reapportionment cases were decided.57 The wide public approval 
these decisions enjoy did not come easily; contemporaries caustically 
accused the reapportionment-era Court of gross overreaching in 
creating constitutional rules and standards “out of whole cloth.”58 
Over time, however, public opinion and judges of all political stripes 
have come to universally hail these decisions as courageous steps 
taken by the Court to restore the health and functioning of a 
democratic electoral system that suffered from serious structural 
flaws.59 
 
 56. Abner J. Mikva, Justice Brennan and the Political Process: Assessing the Legacy of 
Baker v. Carr, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 683, 685 (1995). 
 57. The Court decided Baker v. Carr in 1962. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S 186 (1962). Two years 
later, in 1964, the Court decided Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and Wesberry v. Sanders, 
376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
 58. See Nathaniel Persily, Suing the Government in Hopes of Controlling It: The Evolving 
Justifications for Judicial Involvement in Politics, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 607, 608–09 (2003) 
(discussing the extended reach of the Court post-Baker). 
 59. E.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Constitutional Pluralism and Democratic Politics: 
Reflections on the Interpretive Approach of Baker v. Carr, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1104 (2002) (“If 
Baker v. Carr was ever controversial, it is no longer so. The decision has not only enjoyed near-
universal acceptance, it is also recognized as one of the Court’s finest moments.”). 
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A. Breakdown of the Democratic Process in the Reapportionment 
Era 
The breakdown of the democratic process caused by the 
explosion in partisan gerrymandering is not without precedent in the 
modern era. The nation’s experience with malapportionment and the 
“reverse gerrymander” provides a rich example of a democratic crisis 
that cried out for the Supreme Court to provide a solution. 
When Baker v. Carr60 reached the Supreme Court in 1962, 
members of the political branches of government were being elected 
to office with districting schemes that were wildly out of line with 
demographic realities.61 “When the original complaint in Baker was 
filed in 1959, the Tennessee Legislature had been refusing for nearly 
fifty years to reapportion the state legislative districts.”62 This refusal 
to reapportion flew in the face of an express provision of the 
Tennessee state constitution that required that “each legislative 
district have the same number of qualified voters.”63 The districting 
scheme at issue in Baker was almost indefensible as a democratic 
system of representation. “Districts with 40 percent of the state’s 
voters could elect sixty-three of the ninety-nine members of the 
house, and districts with 37 percent of the voters could elect twenty of 
the thirty-three members of the senate.”64 
Tennessee was by no means unique in this way. Prior to Baker, 
“[m]any states had last redrawn state legislative boundaries at the 
turn of the twentieth century, and their legislatures had become 
backwater relics of past political deals, controlled by lawmakers from 
rural hamlets in decline whose reactionary politics stymied the 
interests of voters in the burgeoning cities and suburbs.”65 By refusing 
to reapportion (and thereby effecting a “reverse gerrymander”), the 
members of the Tennessee legislature entrenched their hold on 
 
 60. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 61. See id. at 192–93 (citing the complaint’s assertion that the federal statute “arbitrarily 
and capriciously apportioned representatives”). 
 62. Stephen Ansolabehere & Samuel Issacharoff, The Story of Baker v. Carr, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 297, 298 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004).  
 63. See id. (“As a result, there existed an enormous disparity in the voting strength of 
individual voters. For example, south-central Moore County, with 2,340 voters, had one seat in 
each house of the state legislature, while Shelby County, covering the city of Memphis, had only 
seven seats for its 312,345 voters.”). 
 64. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 200 (2000).  
 65. Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 23, at 544. 
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political power and artificially bolstered the representation of old, 
rural communities at the expense of newly populous urban areas.66 
When the members of the Court granted certiorari to hear 
Baker, they were keenly aware of the structural flaws in Tennessee’s 
electoral politics, which epitomized the systemic flaws found in the 
electoral systems of states across the nation.67 In deciding Baker, the 
Court considered the claim that Tennessee’s antiquated districting 
scheme violated its voters’ fundamental right to have their votes 
counted without dilution.68 Holding that no political question 
precluded the district court from disposing of the vote dilution claim 
on its merits, the Court sanctioned an unprecedented application of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.69 “Given the 
significance of the issues at stake, it is unsurprising that talismanic and 
formalistic incantations of justiciability ultimately gave way to 
substantial questions of democratic legitimacy.”70 The Court felt 
compelled to intervene, and did so forcefully. 
Two years later, Reynolds v. Sims71 armed the Court with a 
simple standard that forever changed the course of judicial 
involvement in politics. Voicing the oft-repeated maxim that 
“[l]egislators represent people, not trees or acres,” the Court read 
into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause a 
guarantee of equal footing among a state’s citizens in selecting 
political representatives.72 In the eyes of the Reynolds Court, “equal 
footing” meant just that—one citizen’s vote must count the same as 
each other citizen’s vote.73 In practical terms, this meant that each 
 
 66. Baker, 369 U.S. at 248 n.4 (“‘As a consequence, [each] municipality . . . is forced to 
function in a horse and buggy environment where there is little political recognition of the 
heavy demands of an urban population.’” (quoting Brief Amici Curiae of the National Institute 
of Municipal Law Officers at 2, Baker, 369 U.S. 186 (No. 103)). 
 67. See Mikva, supra note 56, at 685. 
 68. Baker, 369 U.S. at 237. 
 69. Id. at 226 (holding that claims of unconstitutional vote dilution are justiciable because 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides workable judicial 
standards proper for evaluating these claims). “Judicial standards under the Equal Protection 
Clause are well developed and familiar, and it has been open to courts since the enactment of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to determine, if on the particular facts they must, that a 
discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action.” Id. 
 70. Charles, supra note 59, at 1132. 
 71. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 72. Id. at 562. 
 73. Id. at 563 (“Weighting the votes of citizens differently, by any method or means . . .  
hardly seems justifiable.”). 
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district in any given state must contain roughly the same number of 
voters as each other district. Quickly termed “one person, one vote,” 
this standard of equipopulation proved to be extraordinarily effective 
in equipping the judicial branch with a clear-cut method of enforcing 
the value of representational equality in the democratic process.74 
Given the stakes at hand, the Reynolds Court was convinced that 
the proper enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment not only 
authorized, but required, this judicial undertaking. “Full and effective 
participation by all citizens in . . . government requires, therefore, that 
each citizen have an equally effective voice in the election of 
members of his state legislature. Modern and viable state government 
needs, and the Constitution demands, no less.”75  
The same year the Court decided Reynolds, it also decided the 
case of Wesberry v. Sanders,76 in which it held that Congressional 
districting plans must also provide for proportional representation.77 
The Court vigorously defended its use of the Equal Protection Clause 
to uphold the individual voting rights of citizens of all races—despite 
precedent that treated the clause as an instrument to be employed 
primarily for the protection of disenfranchised minorities.78 In his 
Reynolds opinion, Chief Justice Earl Warren declared, “[T]he Equal 
Protection Clause guarantees the opportunity for equal participation 
by all voters . . . . Diluting the weight of votes because of place of 
residence impairs basic constitutional rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment just as much as invidious discriminations based upon 
factors such as race . . . .”79 
 
 74. See Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of 
Political Fairness, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1643, 1645 (1993) (“Three decades after the Court’s initial 
forays into the ‘political thicket,’ the commands of one-person, one-vote reign supreme . . . .”). 
 75. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565. As was the case in Baker, in Reynolds the Court addressed 
the constitutionality of a districting scheme used to elect state legislative representatives, this 
time in Alabama. Id. at 537.  
 76. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).  
 77.  See id. at 18 (“[There] is no excuse for ignoring our Constitution’s plain objective of 
making equal representation for equal numbers of people the fundamental goal for the House 
of Representatives.”). 
 78. See, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 37 (1873) (“An 
examination of the history of the causes which led to the adoption of [the post-Civil War] 
amendments and of the amendments themselves, demonstrates that the main purpose . . . was 
the freedom of the African race, the security and perpetuation of that freedom, and their 
protection from the oppressions of the white men who had formerly held them in slavery.”). For 
a discussion of the Court’s willingness to “entertain claims alleging the use of impermissible 
race-conscious districting methods,” see supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 79. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 566. 
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B. Criticism—in the Short Run 
In a single celebrated sentence, the Baker Court disposed of the 
argument that workable judicial standards for ensuring fair 
representation do not exist. “Judicial standards under the Equal 
Protection Clause are well developed and familiar, and it has been 
open to courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
determine, if on the particular facts they must, that a discrimination 
reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action.”80 
Turning its back on fairly recent precedent,81 the Court found no 
political question that precluded reaching the merits of the case.82 
Justice John Marshall Harlan was stunned by the Court’s cursory 
rejection in Baker of the separation of powers principles that had thus 
far kept the Court out of the districting process.83 Harlan criticized 
one person, one vote for being overly simplistic, and thereby 
constituting an illegitimate constitutional standard.84 
Stripped of aphorisms, the Court’s argument boils down to the 
assertion that appellees’ right to vote has been invidiously 
“debased” or “diluted” by systems of apportionment which entitle 
them to vote for fewer legislators than other voters, an assertion 
which is tied to the Equal Protection Clause only by the 
constitutionally frail tautology that “equal” means “equal.”85 
Justice Harlan was far from alone in characterizing one person, 
one vote as a rule whose very simplicity drew attention to its status as 
a construct sprung from the minds of the individual members of the 
Warren Court.86 What many contemporary observers found 
 
 80. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962) (emphasis omitted). 
 81. E.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946) (refusing to reach the merits of a 
districting case because the issue had a “peculiarly political nature”). 
 82. Baker, 369 U.S. at 237. 
 83. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 592 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Considering the Court’s opinion in 
Baker in his Reynolds v. Sims dissent, Justice Harlan remarked: “It is fair to say that, beyond 
discussion of a large number of cases having no relevance to this question, the Court’s views on 
this subject were fully stated in the compass of a single sentence . . . .” Id. at 592 n.5 (emphasis 
added). 
 84. Contrast this criticism of one person, one vote with the contemporary view of the 
prospective standards available to judge partisan gerrymandering, which are often criticized for 
being overly complicated. See infra Part IV.B. 
 85. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 590 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 86. Like many contemporaries, Justice Felix Frankfurter, writing in dissent, was 
incredulous that the Baker majority was willing to suddenly entangle the judiciary in the 
districting process under the supposed authority of the Equal Protection Clause. Baker, 369 U.S. 
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remarkable about Reynolds was the fact that the Court was able to 
craft and implement successfully a concrete measure to gauge the 
constitutionality of the electoral process when the source of that 
measure was found nowhere in the constitutional text.87 
Justice Harlan predicted that the Court’s decision to involve 
itself in the districting process would come at the cost of grave 
damage to the Court’s legitimacy in the eyes of the American polity.88 
Justice Harlan found it hard to believe “that cost was not too high or 
was inevitable.”89 He opined, “It is difficult to imagine a more 
intolerable and inappropriate interference by the judiciary with the 
independent legislatures of the States.”90 
C. Praise—in the Long Run 
The Warren Court is probably most celebrated91 for its then-
controversial antidiscrimination decisions, such as Brown v. Board of 
Education,92 that finally put the Equal Protection Clause to work in 
striking down rampant racial segregation previously sanctioned by 
law.93 Nevertheless, though he had penned Brown and many other 
celebrated cases, Chief Justice Warren was particularly proud of his 
Court’s reapportionment decisions, and is said to have considered 
these decisions as being his Court’s most important.94 According to 
 
at 270 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Invoking the political question doctrine, Justice Frankfurter 
declared, “[T]here is not under our Constitution a judicial remedy for every political mischief, 
for every undesirable exercise of legislative power. The Framers carefully and with deliberate 
forethought refused so to enthrone the judiciary. In this situation, as in others of like nature, 
appeal for relief does not belong here.” Id. Justice Frankfurter was especially concerned with 
the way in which the Court’s intrusion into the political process might politicize the judiciary. 
See id. at 268 (observing that the majority opinion “conveys no intimation what relief, if any, a 
District Court is capable of affording that would not invite legislatures to play ducks and drakes 
with the judiciary”). 
 87. Persily, supra note 58, at 608–09 (“Indeed, the Court created the right to vote out of 
whole cloth—reading into the Equal Protection Clause a protection against discrimination in 
voting that made the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-Fourth Amendments superfluous.”). 
 88. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 624 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[N]o thinking person can fail to 
recognize that the aftermath of these cases, however desirable it may be thought in itself, will 
have been achieved at the cost of a radical alteration in the relationship between the States and 
the Federal Government, more particularly the Federal Judiciary.”). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 615. 
 91. EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 306 (1977). 
 92. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 93. Id. at 493–95. 
 94. WARREN, supra note 91, at 306 (“The Brown case and the changes that it brought 
about caused many people to believe that it was the most important case of my tenure on the 
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John Hart Ely, Justice Warren “used to say that if Reynolds v. Sims 
had been decided before 1954, Brown v. Board of Education would 
have been unnecessary” because of the changes in the southern state 
legislatures that the one-person, one-vote rule would have 
engendered.95 
Warren was particularly proud of the Court’s opinion in Baker: 
The reason I am of the opinion that Baker v. Carr is so important is 
because I believe so devoutly that, to paraphrase Abraham Lincoln’s 
famous epigram, ours is a government of all the people, by all the 
people, and for all the people. It is a representative form of 
government through which the rights and responsibilities of every 
one of us are defined and enforced. If these rights and 
responsibilities are to be fairly realized, it must be done by 
representatives who are responsible to all the people . . . .”96 
The Senate confirmation hearings that sanctioned Justice Samuel 
Alito’s elevation from the Third Circuit to the Supreme Court in 
January of 2006 demonstrate the American polity’s overwhelming 
support for the reapportionment decisions. Shortly before the 
confirmation process, then-Judge Alito came under fire for having 
criticized the reapportionment decisions, first as an undergraduate at 
Princeton and later as a young attorney at the Justice Department.97 
During his confirmation hearings, Alito went to great lengths to 
distance himself from his earlier statements and communicate his full 
support for the reapportionment decisions: 
On the issue of reapportionment, as I sit here today in 2006 . . . I 
think that the principle of one person/one vote is a fundamental part 
of our constitutional law. . . . I don’t see any reason why it should be 
reexamined, and I don’t know that anybody is asking for that to be 
done.98 
 
Court. That appraisal may be correct, but I have never thought so. It seemed to me that 
accolade should go to the case of Baker v. Carr . . . .”). 
 95. JOHN HART ELY, ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND 4 (1996). 
 96. WARREN, supra note 91, at 308. 
 97. Adam Cohen, Editorial, Question for Judge Alito: What About One Person One Vote?, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2006, at A16 (“As a Princeton undergraduate, Samuel Alito sided with 
Tennessee and Alabama in the reapportionment cases . . . . He cited his opposition to the 
reapportionment cases, apparently as a point of pride, in his application for the Reagan Justice 
Department job in 1985 . . . .”). 
 98. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
109th Cong. 380 (2006) (statement of Samuel A. Alito). 
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Senator John Cornyn, a Texas Republican, reinforced Alito’s 
support for the reapportionment decisions: “[H]e has testified here 
and in other areas that he considers one person, one vote a bedrock 
of our democracy. . . . [E]very American believes that today, although 
it was fairly controversial not that many decades ago . . . .”99 
The major lesson of the reapportionment era, then, is that well-
considered decisions that reinvigorate the democratic process will 
gain acceptance from the American public over time and will only 
bolster the Court’s legitimacy. Should members of a future Court 
decide to apply the Equal Protection Clause to assertively police 
partisan gerrymandering, the lessons of the reapportionment era 
indicate that such a decision would gain acceptance over the long run. 
III.  ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE  
JUSTICIABILITY OF PARTISAN GERRYMANDERS 
The major arguments advanced to demonstrate the 
nonjusticiable nature of partisan gerrymandering claims focus on a 
perceived need for the Court to preserve its legitimacy in the eyes of 
the public by adhering to the traditional judicial role and eschewing 
the temptation to fix problems better left to the legislature.100 
These arguments may largely be reduced to two distinct 
propositions. The first proposition is a variation of the “classic” 
political question doctrine101 and asserts that the text of the 
Constitution places the districting power squarely outside of the 
domain of the judiciary.102 The second proposition posits that there 
 
 99. Id. at 701–02 (statement of Sen. John Cornyn, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); see 
also Cohen, supra note 97 (“Baker and Reynolds seem so self-evidently correct today that it is 
hard to imagine that Judge Alito could still really oppose them.”). 
 100. See Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 11, at 545 (“To ask our courts to step in and influence 
political controversies of the highest order under their idiosyncratic impressions of fairness 
should bother many. It is precisely for this reason that this Article calls for a lessened judicial 
role.”). 
 101. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“Sometimes, however, 
the law is that the judicial department has no business entertaining the claim of unlawfulness—
because the question is entrusted to one of the political branches or involves no judicially 
enforceable rights. . . . Such questions are said to be ‘nonjusticiable,’ or ‘political questions.’”); 
accord Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 234–35 (1993) (considering a challenge to 
procedures used in Senate impeachment proceedings as a nonjusticiable political question). 
 102. Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question 
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 239 (2002) (“The 
political question doctrine reflects a constitutional design that does not require the judiciary to 
supply the substantive content of all the Constitution’s provisions.”). 
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are no judicially discoverable and manageable standards available to 
identify the existence of an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.103 
In the context of the partisan gerrymandering debate, this second 
proposition controls the Court’s decision to stay out of the political 
thicket.104 
A. The Districting Power under the Constitution 
The first—and most compelling—sign of a nonjusticiable 
political question is the presence of a textual commitment of power in 
the Constitution to one of the political branches of the federal 
government.105 The political question doctrine is derived from the 
fundamental constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers,106 
which maintains that although the judiciary is empowered to review 
some actions of Congress and the executive branch, there remain 
certain spheres of power that the Constitution has fully committed to 
the political branches of government.107 Within these spheres, the 
actions and decisions of Congress and the executive branch must 
remain the final word, undisturbed by judicial review.108 
The Elections Clause is a provision of Article I that commits to 
Congress the power to oversee the methods employed by each state 
legislature to elect its state’s congressional delegation.109 The 
Elections Clause provides: 
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators 
and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the 
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make 
or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing 
Senators.110 
 
 103. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 279 (plurality opinion). 
 104. Id. at 278. 
 105. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (“Prominent on the surface of any case held to 
involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the 
issue to a coordinate political department . . . .”). 
 106. Barkow, supra note 102, at 264. 
 107. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803) (“[Certain] [s]ubjects 
are political. They respect the nation, not individual rights, and being entrusted to the executive, 
the decision of the executive is conclusive. . . . The acts . . . can never be examinable by the 
courts.”). 
 108. Id. 
 109. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
 110. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Referencing this section of the Constitution, Justice Frankfurter 
stated that the “short of it is that the Constitution has conferred upon 
Congress exclusive authority to secure fair representation by the 
States” in Congress.111 
Justice Frankfurter’s comments notwithstanding, the Court’s 
modern jurisprudence does not treat the Elections Clause as a bar to 
judicial involvement in the districting process, at least when viewed 
through the lens of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause. In Baker, the Court considered the relationship between the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the districting power as described in the 
text of Article I’s Elections Clause.112 In so doing, it approached the 
classical political question doctrine head-on. The Court held that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection controls the 
issue of fair representation in Congress and supersedes the Elections 
Clause in cases of vote dilution.113 
Nevertheless, the classic formulation of the political question 
doctrine and the Elections Clause itself continue to hold sway in the 
modern districting debate and acquire their most sustained force 
when the Court is asked to protect voting rights of groups whose 
composition strays from the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
protections. Because a large segment of the judiciary believes that 
groups as politically potent as the major political parties fall outside 
the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections, the Elections 
Clause continues to enjoy focused application in the Court’s 
treatment of partisan gerrymanders.114 
More specifically, the Elections Clause continues to prevent 
courts from taking the districting process entirely out of the hands of 
the state legislatures, at least for the time being.115 If the courts may 
 
 111. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 554 (1946). 
 112. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 232 (1962). 
 113. Id. (“Smiley, Koenig and Carroll settled the issue in favor of justiciability of questions 
of congressional redistricting.”). In Baker, the Court considered the constitutionality of 
elections to state legislative office as opposed to the national Congress, and Wesberry v. Sanders 
squarely extended Baker’s holding to congressional districting. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 
U.S. 1, 4, 18 (1964) (finding justiciable claims regarding vote dilution in congressional elections). 
 114. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 288 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he Constitution 
contains no such principle. It guarantees equal protection of the law to persons, not equal 
representation in government to equivalently sized groups.”). 
 115. In LULAC, the Court emphasized the continued viability of the Elections Clause by 
starting its discussion of the partisan gerrymandering issue with a verbatim quotation of the full 
LULAC v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2607 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (“[I]t is appropriate to note some basic principles on the roles the States, Congress, and 
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not entirely remove the state legislatures from the districting process, 
the only constitutional methods available for courts to rein in partisan 
excesses in the districting process are to monitor state districting 
actions for improper reliance on partisan considerations or to create 
prophylactic rules that inform the legislatures as to what types of 
redistricting activity will be permitted. The pertinent question thus 
quickly becomes which metrics of post hoc review or prophylactic 
measures, if any, are “judicially discoverable and manageable.”116 
B. The Absence of a Workable Judicial Standard 
The presence or absence of a workable judicial standard is the 
second factor used to gauge the presence of a nonjusticiable political 
question.117 As demonstrated by the Court’s opinion in LULAC, the 
lack of a workable standard stands as the primary reason that the 
Court will not recognize claims of partisan gerrymandering as 
justiciable.118 
Like the first political question factor, which asks if the 
Constitution’s text entrusts responsibility to a political branch of 
government, this second factor is derived in large part from the 
doctrine of separation of powers. When judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards do not exist, an issue may not be a true “case 
or controversy” requiring a judicial solution under Article III of the 
Constitution and thus the responsibility for its resolution lies in the 
 
the courts play in determining how congressional districts are to be drawn. Article I of the 
Constitution provides . . . . ‘The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for . . . 
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof . . . .’”). 
 116. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 277 (plurality opinion); id. at 278 (“[J]udicial action must be governed 
by standard, by rule.”). 
 117. In Vieth, Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion cited Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Court 
in Baker, which listed six independent tests to determine if a political question exists: 
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate 
political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards 
for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy 
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a 
court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due 
coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning 
adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one 
question. 
Id. at 277–78 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217). “These tests are probably listed in descending 
order of both importance and certainty. The second is at issue here, and there is no doubt of its 
validity.” Id. at 278. 
 118. See LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2609–10 (finding that the “sole intent” standard fails to be a 
workable test). 
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domain of the politically accountable branches of government.119 The 
courts’ insistence on proper standards is also a prudential measure: by 
declining to make pronouncements on issues in which they do not 
have the benefit of clear rules of decision, the courts preserve their 
legitimacy.120 
A lack of judicially manageable standards signifies more than the 
Court’s inability to find a convenient measuring device. Rather, the 
Court’s decision to refrain from determining cases in the absence of 
clear standards stems from an acute recognition of the limitations of 
the judicial role.121 “The Court’s authority—possessed of neither the 
purse nor the sword—ultimately rests on sustained public confidence 
in its moral sanction.”122 
No standard for identifying an unconstitutional partisan 
gerrymander has emerged that is robust, accurate, and precise enough 
to gain the sanction of the judiciary.123 Although several prospective 
standards have been proposed to identify unconstitutional partisan 
gerrymanders, aimed at measuring either partisan intent or partisan 
effect, all suffer from weaknesses that critics of judicial involvement 
in politics are quick to identify. 
1. Measures of Partisan Intent.  In both LULAC and Vieth, 
Justice Stevens drafted dissenting opinions disputing the holding in 
each case that no workable standards exist for the Court to fairly and 
effectively identify partisan gerrymanders.124 In both dissents, Justice 
Stevens pointed to the Court’s jurisprudence in the racial 
 
 119. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (describing the types of cases and controversies the courts can 
hear). 
 120. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278 (plurality opinion) (“[J]udicial action must be governed by 
standard, by rule. Laws promulgated by the Legislative Branch can be inconsistent, illogical, and 
ad hoc; law pronounced by the courts must be principled, rational, and based upon reasoned 
distinctions.”). 
 121. See id. at 277 (“Sometimes . . . the law is that the judicial department has no business 
entertaining the claim of unlawfulness—because the question is entrusted to one of the political 
branches . . . .”). 
 122. Baker, 369 U.S. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 123. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 307 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that no 
substantive definition of fairness in districting, or rules to limit judicial intervention, have been 
established). 
 124. LULAC v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2626 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); Vieth, 541 U.S. at 317 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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gerrymandering cases125 as a source of a judicially manageable 
standard that focuses on improper legislative intent.126 Under this 
“predominant intent” test, partisan interests, like racial 
considerations, would be allowed to factor into redistricting decisions, 
as long as they did not “predominate” over all other considerations 
made in drawing district boundaries.127 
Justice Stevens’ predominant intent test boasts a jurisprudential 
advantage that not even one person, one vote enjoyed. It is fairly 
well-grounded in Court precedent, not only with respect to its use in 
the Shaw v. Reno128 line of cases,129 but in its close relation to the easily 
proven intent prong of the Davis v. Bandemer130 test as well. 
Moreover, in LULAC, Justice Stevens cited the Court’s opinion in 
Fortson v. Dorsey131 as valuable precedent that precludes state 
legislatures from acting entirely on the basis of partisan intent132: “‘A 
purely partisan desire to cancel out the voting strength of racial or 
political elements of the voting population’ is not a legitimate 
government purpose.”133 
Justice Antonin Scalia’s plurality opinion in Vieth attempted to 
demonstrate that identifying “predominant intent” would seldom be 
as facile as Justice Stevens contended.134 Justice Scalia first noted that 
 
 125. For example, in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), the Court declared for the first time 
that majority-minority districts—drawn with an eye toward increasing minority representation 
in Congress—may violate the Equal Protection Clause by diluting the votes of individual voters 
on account of their race. Id. at 657–58. In Shaw, the Court stated, “[W]e believe that 
reapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter.” Id. at 647. 
 126. LULAC, 126 S. Ct at 2642 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“With respect to the ‘purpose’ portion of the inquiry, I would apply the standard fashioned by 
the Court in its racial gerrymander cases.”). 
 127. Id. (“[J]udges must analyze whether plaintiffs have proved that [an impermissible 
factor] was the predominant factor motivating a districting decision such that other, race-neutral 
districting principles were subordinated to . . . considerations [of the impermissible factor].”). 
 128. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 630. 
 129. After Shaw, the Court applied this principle in a number of cases (commonly known as 
“the Shaw cases”) to strike down a number of districting plans that were drawn to create 
majority-minority districts. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 905, 927–28 (1995) 
(applying the Shaw holding to strike down a bizarrely shaped Georgia congressional district 
drawn to contain almost exclusively African-American voters). 
 130. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
 131. Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965). 
 132. LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2627 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(citing Fortson, 379 U.S. at 439). 
 133. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Fortson, 379 U.S. at 439). 
 134. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 284–90 (2004) (plurality opinion). In Vieth, the 
plaintiffs advancing the claim alleging unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering on the part of 
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political identification is not an immutable characteristic, in contrast 
to race.135 Thus, the predominant intent test, a metric originally used 
to identify racial gerrymanders, is problematic in a political 
gerrymandering context. Moreover, claims of improper use of race in 
redistricting have traditionally been brought as challenges to the 
composition of individual voting districts.136 Partisan gerrymandering 
claims tend to implicate statewide redistricting plans as a whole and 
thus would require a would-be plaintiff to provide evidence of the 
intent of the full legislature with regard to the entire statewide plan. 
“Vague as the ‘predominant motivation’ test might be when used to 
evaluate single districts, it all but evaporates when applied 
statewide.”137 
2. Measures of Partisan Effect.  When the focus in detecting the 
presence of an impermissible partisan gerrymander shifts from 
legislative intent to analysis of effects on voting patterns, the same 
criteria for identifying effects emerge time and again.138 These criteria 
center on the geometric distribution of the voting districts and on the 
extent to which partisan manipulation undermines traditional 
districting principles—such as respect for district contiguity, 
compactness, and the preservation of neighborhood voting blocs.139 
These tests are similar to the Shaw Court’s “bizarre shape” test: 
when certain districts have been skewed beyond recognition, it 
becomes fairly easy to statistically detect the overwhelming attention 
paid to one or more dimensions of personal identification, be they 
 
the Republican-controlled Pennsylvania legislature requested the Court to adopt and apply a 
“predominant intent” standard similar to that championed by Justice Stevens. Id. at 284. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 285 (plurality opinion). 
 137. Id. 
 138.  The Supreme Court has refused to make use of any prospective standard for identifying 
an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. See supra Part I.B. The same prospective criteria for 
identifying an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander based on partisan effects, however, have 
appeared in the Court’s dissenting opinions and leading academic commentary. See, e.g., Vieth, 
541 U.S. at 321–22 (“The judicial standards applicable to gerrymandering claims are deeply 
rooted in [well-established Court] decisions . . . . ‘[T]he merits of a gerrymandering claim must 
be determined by reference to the configurations of the districts, the observance of political 
subdivision lines, and other criteria that have independent relevance to the fairness of 
redistricting.’” (quoting Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 165 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part))); Ely, supra note 9, at 607, 614–16 (describing and criticizing “Shaw 
v. Reno’s ‘Bizarre Shape’ Test”).  
 139. Bernard Grofman, Criteria For Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. 
REV. 77, 84–88 (1985). 
03__CALIDAS.DOC 5/27/2008 1:47:13 PM 
1438 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:1413 
racial or political. As John Hart Ely observed, “[A] bizarre shape test 
can be given determinate content.”140 
The use of these geometric criteria in identifying impermissible 
partisan gerrymanders can extend far beyond the “bizarre shape” 
test. All else being equal, democratic districting schemes tend to favor 
compact, contiguous districts. When districting maps depart from this 
neutral and expected pattern, “warning flags” should be, and 
generally are, raised in the minds of observers, whether they are 
members of the judiciary or of the public at large.141 
Somewhat ironically, the success of the one-person, one-vote rule 
has complicated the attempt to use effects-based metrics to identify 
partisan gerrymanders. When the Warren Court ruled that the 
requirement of equal population among districts must take priority 
over all other factors—even traditionally neutral districting 
principles—it instantly became more difficult for state legislatures to 
preserve compact districts with simply drawn boundaries while 
maintaining compliance with one person, one vote. 
Moreover, the criterion of “respect for neighborhood 
boundaries,” a districting objective that enjoys a long history of 
respect as a “neutral” districting factor, itself becomes a complicating 
force in the context of testing for impermissible political 
gerrymanders. Voters in a given geographic area often share similar 
political preferences, in large part as a result of their common 
demographics.142 In these situations, respect for neighborhood 
integrity could “direct[ly] conflict with criteria based on political 
competitiveness or electoral responsiveness.”143 
More sophisticated metrics look beyond traditional districting 
criteria; they draw upon social science research and statistical 
deviation tests as applied to district demographic data.144 Prominent 
among these statistical tests is the “symmetry standard” advocated by 
amici curiae in LULAC.145 The symmetry standard is used by social 
 
 140. Ely, supra note 9, at 614. 
 141. Grofman, supra note 139, at 118. 
 142. Id. at 90. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See id. at 103–84 (describing several prominent social science tests that may be applied 
to measure the extent of partisan gerrymandering). 
 145. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae Professors Gary King et al. in Support of Neither 
Party, LULAC v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006) (No. 05-204) (arguing that the symmetry 
standard allows courts to decide by politically neutral principles whether a plan is overly 
partisan). 
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scientists to measure partisan bias and “requires that the electoral 
system treat similarly-situated political parties equally, so that each 
receives the same fraction of legislative seats for a particular vote 
percentage as the other party would receive if it had received the 
same percentage.”146 
This and other statistical metrics have received only a lukewarm 
response from the judiciary. Although Justice Stevens is prepared to 
join the highly respected social scientists and statisticians who believe 
in the efficacy of the symmetry standard and other like tests,147 many 
of his colleagues on the Court are not so inclined. For example, 
Justice Kennedy wrote in LULAC that “we are wary of adopting a 
constitutional standard that invalidates a map that would occur in a 
hypothetical state of affairs. . . . Without altogether discounting its 
utility in redistricting planning and litigation, we conclude that 
asymmetry alone is not a reliable measure of unconstitutional 
partisanship.”148 In a similar vein, the Davis v. Bandemer Court voiced 
its approval of the federal district court’s decision to reject the 
introduction of statistical evidence offered in support of the claim of 
partisan gerrymandering.149 
The use of sophisticated statistical techniques suffers from the 
criticism that although such standards may be effective, they are not 
properly “judicially discernible.”150 Unlike the intuitively pleasing 
one-person, one-vote standard, there is no easy way to formulate a 
version of a statistical test that best articulates the constitutional 
command that each person’s vote be counted equally. The proposed 
statistical tests thus flounder on the rocks of what has become the 
bane of partisan gerrymandering jurisprudence: where to draw the 
line. As Justice Kennedy put it, “courts must be cautious about 
adopting a standard that turns on whether the partisan interests in the 
 
 146. Id. at 4–5. “This standard is widely accepted by scholars as providing a measure of 
partisan fairness in electoral systems.” LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2637 (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
 147. LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2637. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 117 n.3 (1986). “A multitude of conflicting statistical 
evidence was also introduced at the trial. The District Court, however, specifically declined to 
credit any of this evidence, noting that it did not ‘wish to choose which statistician is more 
credible or less credible.’” Id. (quoting Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1485 (S.D. Ind. 
1984), rev’d, 478 U.S. 109 (1986)). 
 150. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
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redistricting process were excessive. Excessiveness is not easily 
determined.”151 
Although statistical tests will no doubt become more robust and 
sophisticated, the Court’s disinclination to apply a statistical metric as 
the fundamental test in this context renders it unlikely that the Court 
will implement any powerful new statistical test as a standard.152 
The weaknesses of the prospective standards, as this Section has 
illustrated, are well-known, as are the costs of the breakdown in the 
democratic process brought on by egregious partisan 
gerrymandering.153 This raises the question of whether the weaknesses 
of the prospective standards preclude the Court from following the 
reapportionment-era Court and protecting citizens’ rights to have 
their votes counted in a meaningful way.  
IV.  THE CASE FOR CORRECTING THE BREAKDOWN 
A. The Time Has Come for Meaningful Anti-Entrenchment 
Judicial Review 
That the Court is willing to strike down improper racial 
gerrymanders but refuses to hear claims of improper partisan 
gerrymandering—as showcased by its decision in LULAC154—
underscores a fundamental pattern of the Court’s jurisprudence. 
Although the Court has vigorously protected minority groups from 
 
 151. Id. at 316 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 152. On the Roberts Court, Justice Kennedy retains his decisive power on this issue: With 
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens prepared to grant relief for claims of partisan 
gerrymandering, a vote in favor of justiciability given by Justice Kennedy would supply the 
critical fifth vote needed for a majority opinion. See id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (“While agreeing with the plurality that the complaint the appellants filed in the 
District Court must be dismissed, and while understanding that great caution is necessary when 
approaching this subject, I would not foreclose all possibility of judicial relief if some limited 
and precise rationale were found to correct an established violation of the Constitution in some 
redistricting cases.”). The replacement of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor with 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito has not produced a majority of justices willing to reach 
the merits of partisan gerrymandering claims. See LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2594, 2652 (Roberts, 
C.J., joined by Alito, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in 
part) (“I agree with the determination that appellants have not provided ‘a reliable standard for 
identifying unconstitutional political gerrymanders.’ The question whether any such standard 
exists . . . has not been argued in these cases. I therefore take no opinion on that question, which 
has divided the Court . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
 153. See supra Part I.A. 
 154. LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2612, 2616. 
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political abuse, it has largely refused to safeguard the operation of the 
majoritarian democratic system as a whole. 
This course of action was not preordained. In the famous 
footnote four to United States v. Carolene Products Company,155 
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone laid out three categories of cases in which 
“exacting judicial scrutiny” may be appropriate.156 The second of 
these three categories was those cases involving legislative activity 
that “restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be 
expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation.”157 When 
political actors seek to entrench their power by restricting the ability 
of the electorate to make changes to the political status quo, this 
justification for heightened judicial scrutiny is squarely invoked.158 
John Hart Ely was a champion of this basis for judicial review, 
and he expressed his view of footnote four’s second category as 
follows: “[I]t is an appropriate function of the Court to keep the 
machinery of democratic government running as it should, to make 
sure the channels of political participation and communication are 
kept open.”159 Professor Ely understood well the implications of the 
Court’s willingness to police the use of race in redistricting schemes 
while turning a blind eye to partisan entrenchment schemes. He 
found it ridiculous that the Court allowed legislators to claim an 
intent to entrench their political party as a defense against allegations 
that they improperly used race in redistricting.160 
On a more fundamental doctrinal level, Justice Scalia and other 
opponents of judicial oversight of political redistricting take issue 
 
 155. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 156. Id. at 152 n.4. 
 157. Id. The first category, instances where a specific textual tenet of the Constitution has 
been violated, has always been a focal point of the Court’s review. The third category invokes 
the antidiscrimination approach to judicial review: judicial intervention is appropriate to 
safeguard the rights of “discrete and insular minorities” whose rights the majoritarian political 
process cannot be relied upon to safeguard. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 76 
(1980). 
 160. Ely, supra note 9, at 620 (stating that such arguments made Ely feel “as if I’ve entered 
Mondo Bizarro”). Ely was reacting to opinions in cases such as Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 
942 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), in which certain Justices argued that evidence of overtly 
partisan motives in redistricting may be presented as a valid defense against claims of minority 
vote dilution brought under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. In Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 
257 (2001), the Court majority expressly adopted this argument. “The basic question is whether 
the legislature drew District 12’s boundaries because of race rather than because of political 
behavior (coupled with traditional, nonracial districting considerations).” Id. 
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with the notion that political groups have any right at all to fair 
representation. In Vieth, Justice Scalia lambasted the plaintiffs for 
bringing a claim founded upon their “right to proportional 
representation.”161 Stating that “the Constitution contains no such 
principle,” he pointed out that the Constitutional text “nowhere says 
that farmers or urban dwellers, Christian fundamentalists or Jews, 
Republicans or Democrats, must be accorded political strength 
proportionate to their numbers.”162 
Justice Scalia’s argument is well considered, but it is subject to 
criticism on the ground that it is overly formalistic. The Constitution 
is agnostic about the existence of organized political parties; because 
many of the Framers hoped to spare the nation the problems 
associated with entrenched political parties, the Constitution itself 
makes no mention of them in its text.163 To deny, however, the 
practical power that political parties exert on the electoral process is 
an exercise in self-deception. 
The famous “white primary” cases—which predate the 
reapportionment era—demonstrate the Court’s past willingness to 
recognize how the machinations of political parties dominate the 
electoral process. In Smith v. Allwright,164 the Court struck down a 
whites-only primary system after rejecting the contention that state 
political parties are purely private groups whose behavior the 
Constitution does not regulate.165 The Court stated, “Constitutional 
rights would be of little value if they could be thus indirectly 
denied.”166 Similarly, in Terry v. Adams,167 the Court rejected the 
“formalistic argument[]” that political parties are “mere private 
groups” that do not fall within the scope of constitutional restraints.168 
When confronted with a wave of egregious partisan gerrymanders 
 
 161. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 288 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 162. Id. 
 163. The U.S. Constitution Online, Things That Are Not in the U.S. Constitution, http:// 
www.usconstitution.net/constnot.html#pparty (last visited Mar. 20, 2008) (“Political parties are 
such a basic part of our political system today, that many people might assume the Constitution 
must at least mention parties in one way or another . . . but there is absolutely no mention of 
political parties anywhere in the Constitution.” (omission in original)). 
 164. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
 165. Id. at 663–65. 
 166. Id. at 664; see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 563 (1964) (“One must be ever 
aware that the Constitution forbids ‘sophisticated as well as simpleminded modes of 
discrimination.’” (quoting Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939))). 
 167. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). 
 168. Id. at 466. 
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engineered by political party operatives, the Court should not blind 
itself to the fact that political parties control the very core of the 
electoral process in a way that farmers and urban dwellers do not. 
The Court’s refusal to tackle the issue of partisan 
gerrymandering invites the continued use of districting processes 
“with pathologies every bit as troubling as the one the Warren Court 
dismantled.”169 “As one member of Congress put it, ‘[b]ecause the 
districts in Congress are more and more one-party dominated, the 
American Congress is more extreme.’ The result is not only less 
electoral accountability but also more fractiousness in 
government . . . .”170 
In his controlling Vieth opinion, Justice Kennedy refused to slam 
the door on future claims of unconstitutional partisan 
gerrymandering.171 In preserving the opportunity for a future Court to 
hold partisan gerrymandering claims justiciable, Justice Kennedy 
pointed out that partisan gerrymandering antics trigger a number of 
traditional justifications for judicial review. He cited footnote four of 
Carolene Products directly and cautioned: 
Where important rights are involved, the impossibility of full 
analytical satisfaction is reason to err on the side of caution. 
Allegations of unconstitutional bias in apportionment are most 
serious claims, for we have long believed that “the right to vote” is 
one of “those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to 
protect minorities.”172 
The landmark reapportionment-era decisions of Baker and 
Reynolds stand as triumphant examples of anti-entrenchment 
jurisprudence.173 As discussed at length in Part II.C,174 these decisions 
are universally praised as bold and well-considered steps taken by the 
Court to clear the dust out of the political process. Invoking the 
Equal Protection Clause to dispose of partisan gerrymandering claims 
 
 169. Sullivan & Karlan, supra note 46, at 713. 
 170. Issacharoff, supra note 50, at 629 (quoting U.S. Rep. John Tanner) (alteration in 
original) (footnote omitted)). 
 171. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 311–12 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
 172. Id. (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)). 
 173. Sullivan & Karlan, supra note 46, at 708; see also Karlan, supra note 49, at 1334 (“Both 
the Warren Court and Ely recognized that one person, one vote . . . is really a majoritarian 
principle dressed in individual rights rhetoric . . . .”). 
 174. See supra Part II.C. 
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seems the next logical step if the Court is ever to pursue the course of 
anti-entrenchment jurisprudence beyond the initial successful forays 
of the reapportionment cases. In his controlling opinion in Vieth, 
Justice Kennedy aptly observed, “Our willingness to enter the 
political thicket of the apportionment process with respect to one-
person, one-vote claims makes it particularly difficult to justify a 
categorical refusal to entertain claims against this other type of 
gerrymandering.”175 
The reapportionment-era decisions, and Reynolds in particular, 
paved the way for Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion in Vieth and all 
other major judicial efforts to rein in blatant partisan gerrymanders. 
Nevertheless, the formidable legacy of one person, one vote has been 
a mixed blessing. Although the success of this standard suggests that 
the courts can successfully engage what had previously been 
considered the purely political realm of districting, its simplicity and 
ease of execution are so universally praised that each of the metrics 
available to police partisan gerrymanders seems cumbersome in 
comparison. 
B. A Defense of the Prospective Standards 
In declining to consider the partisan gerrymandering claim in 
Vieth, the Court found it dispositive that no standard existed that was 
as “solid,” as “judicially manageable,”176 and as likely as one person, 
one vote “to win public acceptance for the courts’ intrusion into a 
process that is the very foundation of democratic decisionmaking.”177 
This concern seems overstated. If the reapportionment decisions 
are any guide, there is every reason to believe that the Court’s 
legitimacy will not be undermined should it choose to correct so grave 
a structural flaw in the electoral process—namely, the partisan 
gerrymandering that has reduced many if not most congressional 
elections to a “farce” and has thrust legislators and political party 
operatives into “the business of rigging elections.”178 
There are several reasons to believe that a future Court’s 
decision to invoke the Equal Protection Clause to strike down 
gerrymandered districting plans would not result in any loss of 
 
 175. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 310 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 176. Id. at 268 (plurality opinion). 
 177. Id. at 291. 
 178. See supra notes 22, 26 and accompanying text. 
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legitimacy. First, a future Court need not overrule established 
precedent to do so. In Davis v. Bandemer, the Court first held claims 
of partisan gerrymandering justiciable under the Equal Protection 
Clause.179 Justice Kennedy’s controlling opinions in both Vieth and 
LULAC refused to explicitly overrule Bandemer and left the door 
wide open for a future Court to consider claims of partisan 
gerrymandering under the Equal Protection Clause.180 The flexible 
state of the Court’s jurisprudence on this issue stands in stark contrast 
to the uniformly unfavorable precedent that existed at the time the 
Court decided the reapportionment cases.181 
Second, the American public, like the Court, recognizes the 
highly visible elements182 that have converged to create the crisis in 
partisan gerrymandering. The American public’s recognition of the 
grave danger that partisan gerrymandering presents for democratic 
governance will lead it to appreciate a future Court’s willingness to 
fashion new doctrine and more assertively police the districting 
process to root out partisan gerrymandering. In deciding a well-
known case that raised deep questions about the value of precedent 
and the virtue of judicial restraint, three sitting Justices observed: 
“[T]he Court’s legitimacy depends on making legally principled 
decisions under circumstances in which their principled character is 
sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the Nation.”183 Although the 
process of making legally principled decisions typically requires close 
 
 179. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 119 (1986). Davis v. Bandemer is weak precedent. See 
Issacharoff, supra note 74, at 1671 (“Whereas Baker was followed within two years by Reynolds 
and Wesberry and their clear articulation of the one-person, one-vote standard, Bandemer begot 
only confusion.”). In this Section, it is important to note only that a future Court decision to 
reach the merits of a partisan gerrymandering claim would not conflict with Bandemer in any 
way. 
 180. See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text. Justice Kennedy appreciated the beneficial 
flexibility that his opinion allowed going forward: “A determination by the Court to deny all 
hopes of intervention could erode confidence in the courts as much as would a premature 
decision to intervene.” Vieth, 541 U.S. at 310 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 181. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266–67 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“The Court 
today reverses a uniform course of decision established by a dozen cases, including one by which 
the very claim now sustained was unanimously rejected only five years ago . . . . Such a massive 
repudiation of the experience of our whole past in asserting destructively novel judicial power 
demands a detailed analysis of the role of this Court in our constitutional scheme . . . . It may 
well impair the Court’s position as the ultimate organ of ‘the supreme Law of the Land’ in that 
vast range of legal problems, often strongly entangled in popular feeling, on which this Court 
must pronounce.”). 
 182. These elements are the “rapid advances in information technology” and “an 
increasingly rancorous partisan political climate.” See supra Part I.A. 
 183. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866 (1992). 
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adherence to past jurisprudence to ensure that the Court’s claimed 
“justification” for its action is “beyond dispute,” this theory of 
legitimacy leaves room for the Court to fashion new doctrine when 
necessary.184 
Finally, it would be shortsighted to overemphasize the apparent 
unattractiveness of the standards available to judge overly partisan 
gerrymanders as compared to the “elegance” of the one-person, one-
vote standard. As discussed in Section A,185 the one-person, one-vote 
standard may seem elegant in retrospect, but it was not considered 
elegant at the time it was created. Rather, the one-person, one-vote 
standard was harshly criticized for being an overly simplistic example 
of improper judicial rulemaking.186 The prospective standards’ relative 
complexity may present a challenge to their effective communication 
throughout the polity—but this complexity may also ward off some of 
the “judicial rulemaking” criticism that a simpler metric might invite. 
CONCLUSION 
In responding to the arguments against the justiciability of 
partisan gerrymandering claims, Justice Stevens has declared that 
“several standards for identifying impermissible partisan influence 
are available to judges.”187 The only missing element, in his opinion, is 
the “will to enforce them.”188 
Considered in light of the nation’s experience with 
reapportionment, the arguments against the justiciability of partisan 
gerrymanders do seem overblown. This Note has drawn a parallel 
between the epidemic of partisan gerrymandering and the breakdown 
in the democratic process that precipitated the reapportionment 
decisions. Given the manner in which the reapportionment decisions 
are viewed in retrospect—as courageous and necessary steps taken by 
the Court to correct a grave breakdown in the democratic process—it 
seems likely that should a future Court decide to reach the merits of 
 
 184. Id. (“People understand that some of the Constitution’s language is hard to fathom and 
that the Court’s Justices are sometimes able to perceive significant facts or to understand 
principles of law that eluded their predecessors and that justify departures from existing 
decisions . . . . [T]he country can accept some correction of error without necessarily questioning 
the legitimacy of the Court.”). 
 185. See supra Part IV.A. 
 186. See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text. 
 187. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 341 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 188. Id. 
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partisan gerrymandering claims, such action would similarly bolster 
the legitimacy of the Court in the long run. 
